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Abstract 
To be widely accepted, smart cards must contain completely trustworthy software. Because smart cards contain 
relatively simple computers, and are used only for a specific lass of applications, it is feasible to make the language used to 
program the software components focused and tiny. Formal methods can be used to precisely specify this language and to 
reason about properties of the language, which results in more trustworthy software. We explore this process by specifying 
the core of a proprietary systems programming language for smart card operating systems. We show how the specification 
obtained is used in proofs, and in the development of tool support. 
Keywords: Smart card operating systems; Structural operational semantics; Software components; Proofs; Tool support 
1. Introduction 
The ITSEC requirements [S] state that formal 
methods must be used in the construction of IT 
systems that are to be endowed with maximal trust. 
The term formal methods describes a mode of 
operation in the design, specification and implemen- 
tation of a system which is characterised by the 
application of formalised methods of reasoning. 
Formal methods: 
_ help to clarify the exact requirements of a system; 
help early detection of mistakes and errors; 
- make it possible to prove properties about a 
system; 
_ make it possible to prove the correctness of an 
implementation. 
We present a formal specification of the core of 
one of the components of the Tosca3 (transaction 
oriented smart card architecture) smart card system 
as it is currently being developed by Integrity Arts 
Inc. It is our aim to demonstrate in this paper the 
benefits of using a formal approach in a setting that 
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is accessible to an audience that is not specialised in 
formal methods. 
We give a detailed specification of the core of the 
proprietary systems programming language Clasp4 
(compact language for abstract secure processors) 
that plays a key role in the Tosca system. The Clasp 
language is designed for secure execution and to 
generate adense object code. The security aspects of 
the language will be highlighted in this paper; space 
precludes us from exploring its density properties. 
Formal specifications of languages are not novel. 
An excellent introduction to the subject may be 
found in [lo]. To our knowledge formal specifica- 
tions as described in this book have not been used to 
help design and reason about smart card systems. 
This is the first contribution of this paper. The 
second contribution is that we indicate how a 
formal specification may be used to help develop 
support tools for the development process of a 
smart card system. We identify tools such as emula- 
tors, simulators and animators and give a code 
fragment from our simulator. The key role of a 
formal specification in producing these support 
tools is explained. 
In Section 2, we discuss the general design of the 
Tosca system as a layered software architecture. In 
Section 3, we present an informal description of the 
core of Clasp, which is then followed by a formal 
specification. Section 4 describes how properties of 
the formal specification can be formulated and 
proved. It also describes how tools can be built to 
create the structural parts of simulators, emulators, 
animators and the actual implementation of com- 
ponents of a smart card system. This section also 
includes future work. Section 5 describes related 
work and the final section presents our conclusions. 
2. A layered software architecture 
Programs in smart cards are usually stored in 
ROM. This ensures that the programs cannot easily 
be tampered with. Unfortunately, this also makes 
smart cards inflexible, because the ROM cannot be 
changed after fabrication. To overcome this limita- 
tion, smart card operating systems need to support 
4 Clasp is a trademark of Integrity Arts Inc. 
the downloading of executable code. To maintain 
the operating system integrity, the loadable execut- 
able code should be contained in recognisable sec- 
tions of application code [2,11], which are usually 
referred to as ‘applets’. In Tosca, the applet code is 
executed by a carefully crafted interpreter that 
makes sure that the applet code behaves properly. 
Later, we make more precise what ‘proper behav- 
iour’ means. The provision of a downloadable 
applet facility makes smart cards flexible, without 
hampering the security. 
The same idea has been used to build flexible Web 
browsers using Java [6]. Java enables applets to be 
downloaded from the server and to be executed by 
the client browser. Java code is compiled by the 
server into a byte code, which is subsequently inter- 
preted. The Java interpreter can check that the 
downloaded applets only use the resources they are 
entitled to [17]. 
A smart card is not a Web browser, so that 
although in principle similar approaches can be 
followed, the practice is different. For one thing, 
smart cards are small. Web browsers may assume 
that there are megabytes of memory available. The 
specially designed Tosca smart card application 
language is to smart cards what Java is to the Web 
browser: application code in Tosca is compiled into 
loadable applets. 
To cope with the limitations of smart cards, the 
Tosca interpreter is itself written in an interpreted 
code, called Clasp. This increases the code density 
and improves the level of trust beyond what is 
possible with a single level of interpretation. The 
time penalty incurred by using multiple levels of 
interpretation is not a problem for computers that 
perform cryptographic operations. A typical smart 
card transaction lasts for about 1 s and the only 
compute intensive aspect is associated with the 
cryptography. By coding the compute intensive 
parts of cryptographic operations at the lowest level 
(directly in machine code), and by making these 
operations available as instructions at a higher level 
of interpretation, smart card systems can be efficient 
and secure. 
Multiple levels of interpretation are a standard 
practice in computer architecture [14]. A typical 
CISC machine would have a micro code program 
that interprets machine instructions. The operating 
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Tosca programs compile into Tosca-object code for the 
Tosca-object interpreter Level 2 
(written in Clasp) 
Clasp programs compile into Clasp-object code for the 
Clasp-object interpreter Level 1 
(written in Assembler) 
Assembler generate 
I I 
machine code for the 
smart card CPU 
I I 
Level 0 
___ 
(built in hardware) 
J 
Fig. 1. Layered smart card software architecture. 
system would interpret system calls, and a user 
program (such as the command language inter- 
preter) might interpret a further set of instructions. 
The point here is that the problems that smart card 
software architects are facing can be solved using 
tried and tested ideas such as the multilevel abstract 
machine and client/server approaches. 
Tosca’s multi-layered software architecture is 
schematically shown in Fig. 1. The Tosca develop- 
ment environment allows for the creation of trust- 
able smart card applications on the basis of the 
Tosca operating system, standard applets and 
customer applets. The Tosca language is used to 
create the applets. Tosca applets are compiled into 
Tosca-object code, which is then interpreted by the 
Tosca-object interpreter. 
The Tosca-object interpreter is written in Clasp, 
as are the standard library modules that are sup- 
plied with this interpreter. The Clasp language is 
a threaded code, interpreted language. It has been 
designed specifically for the provision of trustable 
code. It can be compiled into a dense and efficient 
interpreted code called Clasp-object. 
Clasp-object interpreters are small assembler 
programs, written specifically for typical IC card 
processors, such as the 8051 and the 6805. 
In the rest of this paper, we will focus on parti- 
cular aspects of the Clasp language. 
2.1. The compact and secure Clasp language 
The clasp programming model is that of a stack 
machine. It works in the same way as FORTH in 
that it shares with FORTH the ability to extend 
the language. However, unlike FORTH, Clasp 
provides security and dense code, but does not 
support compiled routines and run-time dictionary 
lookup. 
A Clasp program consists of a number of de- 
clarations, of which we shall only discuss the pro- 
cedure declarations. Each procedure has a name 
and a body, there are no explicit parameters to the 
procedures. Arguments are passed implicity via the 
stack. Return values are left on the stack. This 
makes programming in Clasp a bit awkward, but 
Clasp extensions have been developed to help over- 
come this limitation. A future extended definition 
of the language is under construction to provide 
syntactic support in this aspect. We shall not discuss 
these extensions here, and we shall not even look at 
procedure calls. Instead, we will focus on how the 
body of a procedure is executed. A body consists of 
a number of control statements and stack operators. 
Constructs are separated by semicolons as in 
Pascal. The control statements and the stack oper- 
ators communicate exclusively via the stack. The 
stack is kept in the RAM of the smart card, which 
therefore limits the amount of space that can be used 
for the stack. 
Let us concentrate on the basic mode of operation 
of the Clasp interpreter: it executes one statement or 
stack operator at a time, manipulating the stack as 
appropriate. Some important types of Clasp state- 
ments and operators are: 
The statement: n
pushes the value n onto the stack. Values are bytes 
so they must be in the range 0...255. 
The statement: est true part elsefalse part end 
tests the value that resides on the top of the stack. 
If this value is 1 the statements and operators of 
the true part are executed. The false part is exe- 
cuted if the value is 0. 
The operator: pickn duplicates a particular ele- 
ment of the stack. 
The operator: dropn removes a certain number of 
elements from the stack 
The operator: rotn circularly rotates a particular 
portion of the stack. 
The operators: -, < 
replace the top two elements of the stack by 
a newly computed result. 
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This summary description shows two weak- 
nesses. First, the Clasp language may seem rather 
a poor language. We should point out that we have 
not shown the complete language. For instance, I/O 
and memory operations and in particular the loop 
construct and procedures have not been 
described. We do not need those for the example 
that we will be discussing in detail. Furthermore, the 
description of these concepts is not difficult to add. 
Adding loops and procedures does not increase 
the number of different language constructs ignifi- 
cantly. The complete language is kept small and 
focused which makes it easier to build language 
processors and to reason about programs written in 
the language. 
The second point to make is that the summary 
description above is also vague in many ways. This 
is typical for informal language descriptions. It may 
be a source of considerable frustration both to the 
compiler writer and to the programmer, as neither 
knows exactly what the language designer intended, 
and problems created by such vagueness are in 
general difficult to address. In a trusted environ- 
ment this vagueness cannot be tolerated, and a for- 
mal description of the programming language is 
called for. 
2.2. The syntax of a representative subset of Clasp 
The syntax of a programming language is usually 
described with a formal language, e.g. based on 
BNF, or the pictorial form of BNF: syntax 
diagrams. By using appropriately chosen names for 
the describing rules, the syntax may indicate what 
particular language constructs mean. It does not 
enforce that meaning, the names serve only as a 
suggestion. The formal semantics of the language, 
defined in addition to the syntax, is to provide that. 
Working with semantics may seem difficult and 
mathematical at first, because of the use of special 
symbols. Once adapted to the particular notation, 
using formal methods feels like programming. 
Fig. 2 shows the abstract syntax of the subset of 
Clasp as described earlier. The syntactic category 
n represents numbers and s (and also sl, s2, s, and sr) 
represent statements and stack operators. 
It is customary to use an abstract rather than 
a concrete syntax for reasons of brevity. The differ- 
n ::= 0(...1255 ( numbers ) 
s ::= 71 ( push number onto stack ) 
( skip ( null statement ) 
( test st else s, end ( test value on top of stack ) 
s1; s2 ( statement composition ) 
1 picknldropnjrotn ( stack operators ) 
I --I< ( arithmetic operators ) 
Fig. 2. Abstract syntax of a subset of Clasp. 
ence between the two forms of syntax is that in an 
abstract syntax parentheses indicate how constructs 
are parsed. In a concrete syntax this information is 
encoded in the rules, which are therefore slightly 
more complicated. This rule encoded parsing infor- 
mation is not relevant for the description of the 
meaning of the constructs, and can be safely 
ignored. 
Here is an example of a Clasp code fragment, with 
parentheses to enforce a correct parse: 
s = 5;(3;(2;(pickn; (2;(pickn;( <; 
test skip else 2;rotn end)))))) (1) 
It is possible to check that the statement above 
satisfies the syntactic requirements of Clasp. The 
meaning of the code fragment can only be guessed, 
which is not satisfactory. The next section introduc- 
es the formal aspects of describing the meaning of 
a code fragment such as that of (1). 
3. Towards a formal description of the Clasp subset 
In this section, the execution of the statement 
sequence in Clasp is presented and explained using 
English and diagrams (Section 3.1). Semantic rules 
are introduced (Section 3.2) and the derivation 
sequence of the Clasp example is presented (Section 
3.3). The rules are modified and extended with the 
statement composition rules (Section 3.4). Finally, 
tags are added to distinguish between correct and 
incorrect behaviour (Section 3.5). Tables 2 and 
3 summarise the final rules. 
The application of formal rules makes an execu- 
tion trace more readable, reduces ambiguity in- 
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I (0 (s) s (h) (0 ’ 0) 
(W (0 (ml 00 
Fig. 3. Successive configurations of the stack in the execution of (2). 
herent to vagueness and makes a language descrip- 
tion compact. 
3.1. Executing a Clasp statement sequence 
This section presents the execution of a Clasp 
statement sequence using English and diagrams. It 
will show how elaborate an explanation can become 
when using these techniques instead of formal 
methods used later on. 
Consider the statement sequence (1) again: 
5; 3; 2; pickn; 2; pickn; < ; test skip else 2; rotn end 
(2) 
The sequence consists of eight statements separated 
by the operator;. Brackets are omitted, for we 
assume the sequence is interpreted from left to right. 
All successive stack configurations in the computa- 
tion are shown in Fig. 3. The stack grows down- 
wards. Indexes of the elements are given to the right 
of the stack. 
The first statement in the sequence pushes the 
number 5 onto the stack (b). The execution of the 
next two statements results in the numbers 3 (c) and 
2, respectively, pushed onto the stack(d). After these 
steps, the sequence of statements i  reduced to 
pickn; 2; pickn; < ; test skip else 2; rotn end (3) 
The statement pickn pops the stack, updates the 
index (e), and pushes a copy of the element with the 
index given by the popped element, that is, index 2, 
value 5 (f). The execution continues by pushing 
a 2 onto the stack (g). Again, the pickn statement 
pops the stack and updates the index (h). It pushes 
a copy of the element with the new index 2 (the 
popped element) onto the stack, i.e. the number 3 (i). 
The next statement, <, compares the top two 
elements of the stack. It pushes a 1 (representing 
true) onto the stack if the stack element with index 
2 is less than the element with index 1 (the top 
element). Otherwise, < pushes a 0 (representing 
false). In the case of the example, < pushes a 0 for 
5 # 3 (j). The sequence of statements i now reduced 
to 
test skip else 2; rotn end (4) 
The test statement resembles an $. . then.. .else con- 
struct, but it has no boolean expression. Instead, the 
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boolean on which the decision is based as to which 
branch to take, must have been pushed onto the 
stack before a test statement is encountered. 
The < statement in the sequence can be considered 
as the boolean expression in an $..then...else con- 
struct. The test statement inspects the top of the 
stack, finds a 0, pops it and subsequently executes 
the statements after the else. It results in stack 
configuration (k) and the sequence (2;rotn) to be 
executed. A 2 is pushed onto the stack (1). Like pickn, 
rotn pops the stack and updates the index (m).Then, 
it swaps the element with the value of the popped 
element as its new index and the element at this 
index minus 1. So, it swaps value 5 (index 2) and 
value 3 (index 1) (n). 
Execution of the statement sequence results in 
stack configuration (n). If the initial statements of 
the sequence had been 3;5 instead of 5;3, 
the < would have pushed a 1 instead of a 0. The test 
statement would therefore have resulted in the ex- 
ecution of skip. This would have delivered the same 
final stack configuration (n), for skip does not 
change the stack. 
The execution of the sequence 
2; pickn; 2; pickn; < ; test skip else 2; rotn end 
(5) 
will result in a stack with its top element larger than 
or equal to the element with index 2. 
3.2. Introducing the formal rules 
Instead of using pictures to illustrate the con- 
figuration of the stack and using English to explain 
what happens, formal rules can be used to specify 
the meaning of a sequence of statements more suc- 
cinctly. 
A rule has a standard formal notation. It consists 
of: 
- a tuple (statement; statements, stack), which rep- 
resents a state in the execution, 
_ an arrow * to indicate a transition from this state 
to a second tuple, 
- (statements, stack’), the next state in the 
execution. 
The concatenation (statement; statements) defines 
a sequence of statements, in which statement is the 
first statement. It is followed by the sequence state- 
ments. Just as n is used to denote any number and 
s to denote any sequence of statements, u (user stack) 
is used to denote any stack configuration (including 
the empty stack). The stack grows from right to left, 
and stack elements are concatenated using the oper- 
ator:. The symbol 0 explicitly indicates the empty 
stack. The notation E specifies the empty statement 
sequence. 
Consider the rule for the statement n: 
(n;s,u)*(s,n:u) (6) 
The rule states that the execution of the statement 
n followed by the statements s,with stack configur- 
ation u, results in a new state in which statements 
s are to be executed with the new stack configur- 
ation n:u. Here n is the new top. As an example 
consider the execution of the first three statements of 
sequence (2) in Section 3.1: 
(5;3;2,0) * <3;2,5:0) 
* (2,3:5:0) * (&,2:3:5:0) (7) 
This derivation sequence shows three successive 
applications of rule (6). The numbers 5,3 and 2 are 
pushed onto the stack respectively, resulting in the 
final stack configuration 2:3:5:0, in which 2 is the 
top of the stack and has index 1. All statements are 
executed. Note that a statement can always be 
followed by the empty statement (sequence) E, i.e. 
statement E statement; E, in which = means seman- 
tically equivalent. This implies that E can be omitted. 
In (7), for instance, 5; 3; 2 = 5; 3; 2; E. There is no 
particular reason for omitting E, other than saving 
space. 
A rule’s left-hand side is viewed as a template to 
which the statement sequence to be executed is 
matched. The semantics is thus syntax directed. The 
starting state in (7), (5;3;2,0), and the left-hand 
side of the rule (6), (n;s,u), can be matched by 
considering n = 5, s = 3; 2, and u = 0. Applying the 
rule results in the state (3;2,5:0). Note that 
2 = 2;~isused to match2in (2,3:5:0) of(7)with the 
statement sequence n; s in rule (6). 
The rule for the statement pickn is given by 
(pickn; s, n : u) =S (s, urn] : u) (8) 
The top of the stack on the left-hand side of the rule, 
n, is used as an index in the stack u. u[n] is the 
element in the stack with index n and replaces n as 
the top of the stack. 
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Consider the following example of using pickn: ment test: 
(pickn, 1:3:5) =S (~,3:3:5) (9) 
By considering n = 1, u = 315, s = E and pickn z 
pickn; E, applying the rule results in the state 
(E, 3:3:5), as, after reindexing, 3 is the top of the 
stack u in n : u. It has index 1 and so u[n] = u[ l] = 3. 
Writing the stack as n : u on the left-hand side of the 
rule (8) forces the stack to consist of at least one 
element. 
The rule for the statement rotn is given by 
(rotn; s, n : u) 
* <s, uCuCnl/L uCll/Z . . . , uCn - llinl > 
(10) 
This rule introduces a new notation for stack 
manipulations. A stack element at index i to be 
substituted by a value u is denoted by u[u/i]; 
a number of simultaneous substitutions may be 
denoted by including them as a comma separated 
list inside the square brackets. Whenever the value 
u is defined as an element of u, it is extracted from 
u before any of the substitutions has taken place. 
The resulting stack in (lo), denoted by the outer 
u[. . .], is obtained by simultaneously substituting 
each element with index 1 I i 5 n, by its index-wise 
predecessor in the initial stack, denoted by the inner 
u[i - 11, and the top by u[n]. In effect, all elements 
with index i < n are rotated one place downwards in 
the stack and the element with index n is the top of 
the new stack. 
b=l 
(test s, else sf end; s, b: u) 
(testTrue) 
=S (st; s, u) 
b=O 
(test s, else sf end; S, b: u) 
(test-) 
* ( sf; s, u) 
The rules introduce the notion of a precondition, 
or premise. A premise is a condition on the transi- 
tion, i.e. the transition can only take place if the 
premise is true. The premise is written above the 
horizontal line and the actual transition from state 
to state, or derivation step, is written below it. By 
writing b:u as the stack configuration on the rules’ 
left-hand sides, the top of the stack, b, can be used 
in the premise. If b = 1, the rule named (testTrue) 
matches, execution continues by executing s,;s. If 
b = 0, rule (testFalse) is applied, and the sequence sf; s 
is to be executed. The rules are mutually exclusive 
but not complete, as the behaviour in case b > 1 is 
not defined. This will be amended in Section 3.5, but 
for now, it is assumed that the boolean b is either 
Oor 1. 
The statement < also has two possible execution 
paths. Depending on the outcome of the com- 
parison of the top two elements of the stack, either 
a 0 or a 1 is pushed onto the stack. Having already 
introduced the notion of a premise, the rules for the 
statement < are included (see Table 1) without 
further explanation. 
When n = 2, the rule defines a swap function, as 
was shown in Section 3.1. The rule precisely defines 
the behaviour of the statement rotn for all n (i.e. 
for all ‘correct’ II, for stack underflow and overflow 
are not taken into account, yet). As an example, 
consider: 
The rule for the statement skip is given by 
(skip; s, u) * (s, u) (12) 
The execution of skip does not affect the stack. If 
a test statement was to be defined with only one 
execution path, for instance, skip can be used to 
constitute the empty statement sequence as the 
other path. 
(rotn, 3:1:2:3:4) +- (~,3:1:2:4) (11) 
After reindexing, n = 3, u[3] = 3, u[l] = 1, and 
u[2] = 2, and u[u[3]/1, u [ 1]/2, u[2]/3] results in the 
final stack configuration. 
Table 1 summarises the named rules introduced 
in this section. 
3.3. Execution of the Clasp statement sequence 
using the formal rules 
The test statement has two possible executions. If
a 0 resides on top of the current stack, thefalse part 
after the keyword else is executed. If the current 
top has value 1, test continues by executing the true 
part. Two rules define the behaviour of the state- 
Consider again the statement sequence (2). Its 
execution trace is derived by the successive applica- 
tion of the formal rules (Table 1) to its constituents. 
This derivation sequence is given below. Each step is 
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annotated with the rule that was applied. 3.4. Adding the composition rules 
(5; 3; 2; pickn; 2; pickn; < ; test skip else 2; rotn end, 0) * (number) 
(3; 2; pickn; 2; pickn; < ; test skip else 2; rotn end, 5 $) * (number) 
(2; pickn; 2; pickn; < ; test skip else 2; rotn end, 3: 5:0) * (number) 
(pickn; 2; pickn; <; test skip else 2; rotn end, 2:3:5:0) => @ickn) 
(2; pickn; < ; test skip else 2; rotn end, 5: 3 : 5:0) a (number) 
( pickn; < ; test skip else 2; rotn end, 2: 5: 3 : 5:0) * (pickn) 
( <; test skip else 2; rotn end, 3:5:3:5:0) * ( < f&e) 
(test skip else 2; rotn end, 0:3:5:0) * (test-) 
(2; rotn, 315~0) * (number) 
(rotn, 2131510) * (rotn) 
The derivation sequence contains all semantically 
relevant information in only 11 formal lines. It 
shows each configuration of the stack and what 
statements are left to be executed. The derivation 
sequence shows at least two of the advantages of 
using formal rules instead of English and pictures, 
namely compactness and clarity. Compactness 
and clarity help to make precise the behaviour of an 
execution or system, and therefore help to detect 
mistakes and errors. 
(E, 5:3:0) 
In Section 3.2, the general form of a rule was 
defined as follows: 
(statement; statements, stack) 
* (statements, stack’) 
This means that after executing statement, and 
perhaps changing the stack, statements are left to be 
executed. The first statement is of interest, but also 
the fact that statements follow it (though not their 
Table 1 
The simplified formal rules of the subset of Clasp 
(n;s,u) = (s,n:u) 
Wp;s,u) * <s,u) 
b=l 
(tests, else s, end;s, b:u) 3 (s;s, u) 
b=O 
(test s, else s/ end; s, b : u) => (s,-; s, u) 
n2 < nI 
(<;s,n,:n,:u) => (s,l:u) 
n2 2 n1 
(<;s,n,:n,:u) * (s,O:u) 
(pickn;s,n:u) = (s,u[n]:u) 
(rotn;s,n:u) 5. (s, u[u[n]/l,u[1]/2,. ,u[n - l]/n]> 
(number) 
WP) 
(test=“e) 
(tesPe) 
TIus (< 1 
F&r (< 1 
(pickn) 
(rotn) 
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precise contents). A different approach from the one 
used in Section 3.2 is to only concentrate on the 
individual statements. This allows for separation of 
concerns, bearing in mind the principle “if you can 
separate then separate”. Sequencing and the actual 
computation are the two concerns here. Separation 
of the two will lead to shorter derivations and it is 
more extensible. 
The rule for the statement n has been given by 
(n;s,u) * (s,n:u). 
It is now defined as: 
((4 u) =+ (a, n : u>). 
Hence, we are no longer concerned with the state- 
ments that follow n. The final tables of Section 
3 summarises the adapted rules (with tags to be 
introduced in Section 3.5). 
A mechanism is needed for the newly defined rules 
to be applied to a sequence of statements as before. 
For this purpose, two composition rules are intro- 
duced: 
(s1,u) * (&VU’) 
(s,;s,,u) * (sz,u’) 
(;) 
(Q,U) * ($,u’) A s; # e 
<s,;s,,u) =e= <s;;sz,e 
( ; step) 
The first rule states that if the execution of s, will 
lead to a state in which there are no more statements 
to be executed (E) and in which the new stack is u’ 
(this includes the possibility that u and U’ are the 
same, as would be the case after the execution of 
skip), the statement sequence (s,; s2, u) changes to 
(s,,u’), i.e. to a state in which s2 is to be executed 
with the new stack configuration u’. The second rule 
differs from the first rule in that s1 is now a com- 
pound statement and the one step execution does 
not lead to E (which is made explicit by including 
(s; # E) in the premise), but rather to the statements 
s;. Here, the new stack configuration is also denoted 
by u’ for which same reasoning holds as for u’ in the 
first rule. The statement sequence (s,;s,,u) now 
continues as (s;; s2, u’). 
To summarise, rules are now of the form 
(statement, stuck) - (E, stuck’), 
and the composition rules were added to be able to 
reason about a sequence of statements. We have 
separated sequencing from doing the stack oper- 
ations. 
3.5 Adding tags 
So far, it was assumed that statements that affect 
the stack can always be executed. In an implementa- 
tion, this cannot be assumed. When using a stack, 
two kinds of errors may occur: stack overflow and 
stack underflow. The first occurs when a statement 
pushes data onto a full stack, or when the stack is 
addressed with an index that is larger than its size. 
Here, (number) is the only rule that pushes data onto 
the stack. Several other rules may use an ‘incorrect’ 
index. A mechanism is needed to trap this error. The 
other error, stack underflow, occurs when an empty 
stack is popped, or when the stack is addressed with 
an index less than 1. Several rules may cause this 
error by using an ‘incorrect’ index. The rule (<) 
compares the top two elements of the stack, but 
what happens when the stack is only one element 
large or even empty? A mechanism must be present 
to handle these errors, for rules must always be 
precise. 
For this purpose, the notion of a tag is introduced, 
and each state is extended with a tag. Consequently, 
the general form of the rules is: 
(statement, stack, ok ) -(E, stack, tag) 
in which tag is either ok or nok (not ok). Note that 
the tag on the left-hand side is always ok. If 
tag = nok in the current state, no rule should match, 
for, in that case, an error has occurred and execution 
should be stopped (an exception handling mechan- 
ism is provided in Clasp, but limitation of space 
precludes us from explaining that here). 
The execution of statement n is now defined 
by two rules: one defining its behaviour when no 
stack overflow will occur, and one defining it when it 
will: 
#u < max 
(n,u,ok) =S (&,n:u,ok) 
#u 2 max 
(n, u, ok) * (E, u, nokfu,, > 
( numberf”“) 
Here, #u is the number of elements in the stack. If 
this number is greater or equal to a certain 
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Table 2 
Part 1 of the formal rules of the subset of Clasp with the 
composition rules and tags added 
#u>max 
(n, u, ok) * (6, u, nok& 
#u<max 
(n, u, ok) * (E, n: u, ok) 
(skip, u, ok) * (E,u, ok) 
#u<l 
(test st else sI end, u, ok) * (E, u, nok.mp,Y) 
b>l 
(test st else sf end, b: u, ok) = (E,u, nok=,,,) 
b=l 
(test s, else sf end, b:u, ok) 3 (st, II, ok) 
b=O 
(test s, else s, end, b:u, ok) = (s,, u, ok) 
(sl, u, ok) - (8, u’, ok) 
<s,; s2, u, ok) * <sz, u’, ok) 
(s,,u,ok) = (s;,u’,ok) A s; # E 
(s1;s2,u,ok)~(s;;s2,u’,ok) 
<sl, u, ok) * (6, u’, nokJ 
<s,;s,,u,ok) = (~,u’,nokJ 
(numberf”‘) 
(number”) 
(skip) 
(testernay) 
(k?wb) 
(test=‘“e) 
Ck) 
(;“““) 
C”“‘) 
predefined number max which denotes the maxi- 
mum stack size, rule (numberfu”) applies, and the tag 
is set to nok. The subscriptfull is used to distinguish 
between different kinds of errors. If #U < max, the 
statement is executed as before, i.e. n is pushed, and 
the tag is not changed. Note that the two rules are 
mutually exclusive and that they completely cover 
all possibilities. This is a requirement when proving 
properties (Section 4.1). 
In Section 3.2, the value b used in the premise of 
the two test rules was assumed to be either 0 or 1. 
The two rules are mutually exclusive, but not com- 
plete. We now have a mechanism with which it is 
possible to add another rule to replace the ad hoc 
assumption, and that is to be used when b > 1. This 
new rule is given by: 
b>l 
(test s, else sf end, b: u, ok) * (E, u, nok,,,,,) 
(fesP*) 
In addition, a rule is needed here to deal with the 
error of stack underflow. If the number of elements 
in the stack is less than 1, the statement cannot be 
executed. Execution is therefore stopped, and the 
tag is set to nok: 
#u<l 
(test s, else sf end, u, ok) * (E, u, nokemp& 
(fesfemptY) 
The other two rules, (festTrue) and (fesfFa’se), are as 
before, maintaining the ok-status, and are included 
in the two final tables, Tables 2 and 3. Note that 
#u 2 1 is not included in the premises of these two 
rules. The construction b:u implicitly denotes that 
there must be at least one element in the stack. 
In the pickn statement, nis used as an index in the 
stack. The simplified rule (pickn) is now extended 
with a premise to only match when the index n is 
‘correct’. Two rules are added to define the transi- 
tions to error states (see Tables 2 and 3). 
The form of the rules introduced in Section 3.4 
makes the rules more extensible than the form of the 
simplified rules introduced in Section 3.2. If we had 
extended the simplified rules with the tags, Tables 
2 and 3 would be twice as big. We would have had to 
define the behaviour of statements in (statement; 
statements) for every possible execution of state- 
ment. 
Tables 2 and 3 summarise all the rules with the 
tags and the composition rules added. Note that the 
tag nok, in the premise of the composition rule (;“““) 
is used to pass the tag nok with the message mpty, 
full or errb (hence the x) to the transition below the 
horizontal line. 
4. Using the formal description 
We have discussed the formal description of the 
subset of the Clasp language. The rules precisely 
describe, in a clear and compact way, what happens 
in a normal situation and in case some error occurs 
(proper behaviour). In this section, this formal de- 
scription is used. First, it will be shown how it can be 
used to prove properties of the language. In the 
second part, a more general view is given on using 
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Table 3 
Part 2 of the formal rules of the subset of Clasp with the composition rules and 
tags added 
#u<l 
(Wkn, u, ok) =, (E, u, nok_,& 
n<l v n>#u 
(pickn, n:u, ok) + (E, IA, nokpiclin) 
n21 Anl#u 
(pickn,n:u,ok) 3 (.s,u[n]:u,ok) 
#u<l 
(rotn, u, ok) => (E, u, noke,,& 
n<2vn>#u 
(rotn,n:u,ok) a(&,u,nok rDfn ) 
n22 An<#u 
(rotn,n:u,ok)=>(E,u[u[n]/l,u[1]/2,...,u[n-l]/n],ok) 
#u<2 
(<,u,ok) q(E,u,nok emlw > 
5 <n, 
( < ,n,:n,:u,ok) + (E, l:u,ok) 
nz 2 n1 
( <,nl:n,:u,ok)=(&,O:u,ok) 
(picktP) 
(pick@) 
(rotnemprY) 
(rotf@) 
(rotnO’) 
(< ewfy 1 
True (< 1 
False (< 1 
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the formal description in building support tools for 
the software development process. 
4.1. Proving properties 
Security is an important aspect of a smart card 
system. Runtime errors like stack overflow, stack 
underflow and non-determinism of code impinge on 
the security. Trust can be gained by proving that 
these errors will not occur, or that if they do, they 
will be dealt with. The formal rules allow for such 
proofs. Since the rules are precisely the formal speci- 
fication of the language Clasp, properties proven 
using the rules are properties proven for Clasp 
programs. 
All proofs follow the same strategy [lo] (this still 
holds when the subset is extended with loop con- 
structs): prove that the property holds for all deriva- 
tion sequences of length 0. Then prove the property 
holds for all other derivation sequences as follows: 
assume that the property holds for all derivation 
sequences of length at most k (this is the induction 
hypothesis) and show that it holds for derivation 
sequences of length k + 1. 
Now, it is proven that stack overflow will not 
occur, i.e. execution continues if execution of the 
current statement will not cause the stack to over- 
flow, and execution is stopped with the tag set to nok 
if it does. 
Assumption: Execution is started with #stuck I
max. Throughout the proof stuck is used to denote 
any stack, and, as before, max is used to denote the 
maximum stack size. 
Case k = 0: The property #stack I max still 
holds, for if no statements are executed, #stuck I
max holds by the initial assumption. 
Case k + 1: Every possible statement o be exe- 
cuted as the (k + 1) th statement must be looked at: 
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Subcase n: When n is encountered, #stack I max 
holds by induction. Now, suppose there is stack 
overflow danger, i.e. #stack = max. Then, rule 
(numberfuzz) applies and deals with this in the proper 
way, i.e. execution is stopped and the tag is set to 
nok. There is no other rule that matches in this 
situation. The other possibility is that #stack< 
max. Now (numberok) applies, and n is pushed. Con- 
sequently, the stack will grow, but #stack I max 
still holds. 
Subcase skip: Again, by induction this statement 
will be encountered with #stack I max. skip does 
not change the stack, so #stack I max still holds. 
Subcase test: By induction, #stack < max holds 
when encountering statement est. Here, stack = 
b:u, and in all the test rules except (testempty), one 
element is taken off the stack, namely b. In effect 
#stack I max still holds. (testemptY) does not change 
the stack so, because #stack I max holds before this 
rule is applied, it still holds. 
Subcase; : In all; rules, the single step in the 
premise is the last step in the induction, i.e. it is the 
step from k - 1 to k. So, after execution of the 
premise #stack I max holds. Now, none of the; 
rules thereafter change the stack. Therefore, 
#stack I max still holds. 
Subcase pickn: By induction #stack I max holds 
when encountering the statement pickn. (picknemptY) 
does not change the stack, and (picknnok) pops an 
element, so, in both cases, #stack I max still holds 
after execution. (picknok) replaces the top element by 
another element, so, again, if by induction 
#stack I max, it still holds now. 
Subcase rotn: Similar to pickn, for it also replaces 
(just more) elements in the stack, and does not 
change the size of the stack. So, #stack I max still 
holds after executing the statement. 
Subcase < : ( < empty) does not change the size of 
the stack. The other two rules replace the top two 
elements by one element and therefore do not in- 
crease the number of elements in the stack (in fact, 
they are decreasing it). So, in each case, #stack 5 
max still holds after execution. 
The property is now proven for all possible 
statements to be executed next. This finishes the 
proof for case k + 1. Because k can be any natural 
number, the property is proven for any sequence 
length. 
The above proof constitutes an informal proof, in 
the sense that it does not use any formal notation as 
is used in a formal proof. It is just as thorough 
though. 
It was proven that the error stack overflow will 
be dealt with. A similar proof can be given for the 
error stack underflow. Instead of ensuring that 
#stack I max holds all the time, it must be ensured 
that #stack 2 0 holds all the time. Execution is 
started with #stack 2 0 (assumption). As an 
example, consider the subcase for statement rotn. 
Using the induction hypothesis, #stack 2 0 holds 
when encountering a statement rotn. Suppose that 
#stack = 0, and popping an element will cause stack 
underflow. This situation is intercepted by rule 
(rotnemptY). Apart from ensuring that there is a rule 
that matches, it also needs to be ensured that there is 
no other rule that matches. Indeed this is the case, 
for it can immediately be seen that the other rules all 
write their starting stack configuration as n:u, i.e. at 
least one element on the stack. The other possibility 
to cause stack underflow is when n is ‘not right’, i.e. 
n < 2, for at least two elements will be needed in 
order to do a rotation. Here, rule (rotnnok) matches, 
which also traps the possibility of n > #stack. Note 
that the two premises of (rotnnok) do not have to be 
included in the rule (rotnempty). The only other possi- 
bility left is that n is ‘right’. In this situation, only rule 
(rotnok) matches. Note also that the premise #u 2 2 
need not be added. If #u I 1 then n would have to be 
either 0 or 1, because n I #u is also part of the 
premise. The premise n 2 2 would not be true, and 
using the boolean construct he premise as a whole 
would not be true. 
In a similar way, other properties that are import- 
ant to smart card software can be proven [lo]. 
Determinism of the language is such a property. A 
formal proof is not given here. Informally, one should 
prove that every possible xecution for every possible 
statement has one, and only one, matching rule that 
defines its behaviour. This is not difficult to prove for 
the subset of the Clasp language, i.e. the rules in 
Tables 2 and 3. For instance, the rules for the state- 
ment n define the only two possible executions, and 
they are mutually exclusive. Again, induction can be 
used to prove the property for compound statements. 
New rules or new restrictions in the language can 
also be defined. Consider, for instance, the possibil- 
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ity of byte overflow. The only statement that pushes 
a number onto the stack, namely n, cannot cause 
overflow, for 0 I n I 255 by definition. The state- 
ment < also deals with bytes, for it compares two 
bytes. The rules, however, define its behaviour: 
either a 0 or a 1 is pushed onto the stack. So, < will 
not cause any problems. Of course, the inequality 
operators use arithmetic operators, and these oper- 
ators should also be ‘checked’. Our subset of Clasp 
has - as its only arithmetic operator, so, this is the 
only operator that needs to be looked at. We now do 
the reverse of what we did before: we design a rule 
for this arithmetic operator, in such a way, that it 
will behave correctly. The rules can be defined as: 
#u<2 
( -, u, ok) 3 (8, u, n&,,ptY> 
( _ empty) 
(--,n,:n,:u,ok)*(&,(n2 -n,)mod256:u,ok) 
( - Ok) 
Rule (-Ok) simply ignores byte overflow by using 
the mod function. An alternative approach is to 
generate an exception (Clasp includes exception 
handling, but it is not shown here). The point here is 
that any rule can be defined, and a choice must be 
made when designing a language. 
4.2. Tool support 
A formal specification can play an important role 
in the software engineering process. Fig. 4 identifies 
the major ‘components’ in the process. We use the 
term component here as a general term for such 
diverse items as the concepts on which a system is 
designed, the specification of the system, and also 
the documentation, implementation and ‘derived 
components’. The latter includes various tools, such 
concept 
Documentation - Spec. - Derived components 
/ \ 
Testing, maintenance Implementation 
Fig. 4. Relationships between specification, components and de- 
rived components in the software engineering process. 
as simulators of the system. Fig. 4 shows only some 
of the many relationships between the components. 
For example the connection between concept and 
specification represents an iterative process of 
design and redesign. The connection between speci- 
fication and derived components represents pro- 
gram generation tools, and programming and 
design efforts. 
A formal description of the subset of the Clasp 
language has been given and its use demonstrated. 
This is just one component of the software for smart 
cards. Any system is as weak as its weakest compo- 
nent so there is a need for formally specifying the 
complete Clasp language, and also Tosca, the com- 
pilers, the interpreters and the assembler. Then we 
can begin to reason about the system as a whole. We 
have formally specified a substantial part of the 
Clasp language, its compiler and interpreter. Cur- 
rently we are working on the specification of Tosca 
and on completing the Clasp specifications. 
Work on the components hould be supported by 
adequate tools, which basically take as input the 
specification and produce as output a derived com- 
ponent. The following are useful derived compo- 
nents, which implement all or part of the functional 
behaviour of the component. The non-functional 
behaviour (that is how much resources are being 
used) of the derived components is generally differ- 
ent from the non-functional behaviour of the com- 
ponent itself. 
-An animator implements the functional behaviour 
as specified, and supports interaction. The key 
feature of an animator is that it allows the user to 
inspect and even change data whilst the data are 
being processed. 
-A simulator implements the functional behaviour 
as specified, or an abstraction of the behaviour, 
and supports statistics gathering like timing. 
-An emulator implements precisely the functional 
behaviour as specified, and is often used as a 
prototype. 
These definitions are not static, and vary con- 
siderably across different fields of computer science. 
Tool support is necessary to keep the develop- 
ment of these derived components, the specification, 
the documentation and the testing and verification 
procedures, and the real component in step. 
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A formal specification in the style that we have 
presented in the previous section is abstract in the 
sense that it only deals with the functional behav- 
iour. At the same time it is detailed because it 
describes precisely what should happen in a normal 
situation and also in case some error has occurred. 
Our formal specification can thus serve as a starting 
point for building the derived components as well as 
the real implementation. The programming activity 
involved should be mainly concerned with choosing 
the right programming language and with creating 
the non-functional behaviours desired for the 
derived and real components. The functional behav- 
iour is always the same. 
We have built a simple tool to generate the major 
part of the animator from our Clasp specification. 
The animator is written in the functional program- 
ming language Miranda5 [15]. We are now in the 
process of building a generator for simulators. Here 
is a fragment of such a simulator, written in C: 
voidtest(statement * s,stack*u,tag+o){ 
if(o_>okaok_-enum==Ok){ 
if(stac_size(u)< l){ 
s_>statement_enum=Empty; 
tag_set_nok(o,Nok,“stackempty"); 
) else{ 
intb=stack_pop(u); 
if(b>l){ 
s->statement_enum=Empty ; 
tag_set_nok(o,Nok,"errb"); 
}elseif(b==l){ 
*s=* s->statement_union.test.test_time; 
tag_set_ok(o,Ok); 
}elseif(b==o){ 
*s=*s->statement_union.test.test_false; 
tag_set_ok(o,Ok); 
The structures statement, stack and tag 
correspond to the statements s, the stack u and the 
tag oklnok of the specification of Tables 2 and 3. The 
function test corresponds to the four rules 
(testempty), (testerrb), (testTrue) and (testFalSe). 
Without going into the detail of the C fragment, 
we can see that the structure of the function reflects 
that of the four rules from the specification. The first 
conditional makes sure that the test statement is 
only executed if the tag is ok. The next conditional 
checks whether the stack contains at least one el- 
ement. If this is the case, the final conditionals 
distinguish between the case that the boolean value 
b on the top of the stack represents a non-boolean 
value, true or false. 
The result of executing the test statement is re- 
corded by modifying the structures that are passed 
to the function test. This is the only major differ- 
ence between the specification and the simulator. It 
represents our efforts to make the simulator run 
fast, whilst maintaining the appropriate functional 
behaviour. 
5. Related work 
An approach similar to ours in the domain of 
building a high integrity compiler is described by 
Stepney [12]. Her compiler is for a small general 
purpose language, which by coincidence is also 
called Tosca. 
Much work has been done to develop formal 
methods specifically for reasoning about protocols. 
The specification formalism LOTOS [ 161 is widely 
used in this area. The protocols that are used in 
smart card systems could also be modelled using 
formalisms such as LOTOS but we do not know 
whether that has been done. The work at GMD 
[4, 91 uses a Petri net based method to perform 
model checking on the protocols used in the STAR- 
COS and STARMOD systems [131. 
In our own previous work, we have looked at the 
modelling of a smart card protocol with a view to 
proving liveness of that protocol [7]. We have 
recently built an animation system [S] for the proto- 
cols that are defined in the CEN European standard 
Inter Sector electronic purse [3]. This work explores 
the use of the visual programming language Pro- 
graph6 [l] as an animation support system. The 
connection between a formal specification of the 
’ Miranda is a trademark of Research Software Ltd. 6 Prograph is a trademark of Pictorius Inc. 
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protocols and the production of the animation is 
still to be made. 
6. Conclusions 
Using a formal approach to building trustworthy 
software is not widely practiced in the smart card 
community. This is to some extent surprising: the 
reason why smart cards are used is because they rely 
on cryptographic protocols. Cryptology is a branch 
of mathematics that is devoted to proving proper- 
ties of cryptographic algorithms and protocols. In 
practice, when it comes to implementing these pro- 
tocols in smart cards, the attention shifts to more 
technical issues, such as getting the implementation 
to work and making it work with limited resources, 
leaving correctness assurance aside. 
We have shown that formal methods can profit- 
ably be used to build trustworthy components for 
a smart card system. Our main argument is that 
smart cards are tiny, and so the languages used to 
program the software components hould be highly 
focused and small. This makes it feasible to specify 
such languages formally. Programs written in such 
languages have a well-defined meaning. They are 
therefore amenable to formal reasoning. We have 
shown how properties can be proved, when given 
a small subset of the language that plays an import- 
ant r81e in our smart card system. However, the 
methods used can be applied to any language or 
system. We have discussed the necessity of tool 
support in smart card software engineering. By 
giving a sample component of a simulator we have 
shown how formal rules can be used to help build 
suitable tools. 
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